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[Crim. No. 7781.

In Bank.

July 14, 1964.]

In re PAUL KERN IMBLER on Habeas Corpus.
[1] Habeas Corpus-Grounds for Belief-Bentence.-Where defendant has been convicted of fIrst degree murder and sentenced to death and such judgment and sentence have been
aftlrmed on appeal, errors which occurred during defendant's penalty trial but which were not deemed to be prejudicial
by the Supreme Court until after defendant's appeal had been
determined may properly be raised on habeas corpus.
[2] Criminal Law-Punisbment-Procedure for Determining Penalty.-On the penalty phase of a murder case, it was prejudicial error for the prosecutor to state in his argument to the
jury that life imprisonment does not mean life imprisonment
and to attack the Adult Authority for its alleged inconsistency
in releasing on parole prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment,
and for the court to instruct that the jurors might consider in

[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Habeas Corpus, § 39; Am.Jur., Habeas
Corpus (1st ed § 55 et seq).
:Melt. Dig. References: [1] HabeRs Corpus, § 34(1); [2] Criminal Law. ~ 1011.1.
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determining w:uether to sentence defendant to death or life
imprisonment, "the possibility of parole after at least seven
years' imprismnment of one sentenced to prison for life.

PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to review a·death penalty
imposed on petitiuner after his conviction of murder. Writ
granted as to perui.lty trial; judgment imposing death penalty
reversed as to p.enalty and in all other respects affirmed;
petitioner remaz:I:i'!!d to custody of Superior Court of Los
Angeles County for a new penalty trial.
Gregory S. Sc.put, under appointment by the Supreme
Court, and Jules C. Goldstone for Petitioner.
Earl Klein as .Lmicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, Albert W. Harris, Jr.,
Robert R. Granue:ei and John F. Kraetzer, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Respr.mdent.

)

TRAYNOR, J.-.A jury convicted petitioner of first degree
murder and fixed lhis penalty at death. We affirmed the judgment (People v. Itw.Uer, 57 Cal.2d 711 [21 Cal.Rptr. 568, 371
P.2d 304]) and wereafter denied a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus ehaJ..lenging the determination of petitioner's
guilt. (In re Imi-ter, 60 Cal.2d 554 [35 Cal.Rptr. 293, 387
P.2d 6].) PetitioU'J' now contends that his penalty should be
redetermined beez.use the errors condemned in People Y.
Morse, 60 Ca1.2d ~31 [36 Cal.Rptr. 201, 388 P.2d 33], occurred during his penalty trial. [1] This issue is properly
raised on habeas eorpus. (In re Jackson, ante, p. 500 [39
Ca1.Rptr. 220, 3~ P.2d 420].)
The only evide%:Lee introduced at the penalty trial was the
testimony of a fMmer member of the California Adult Authority about the qualifications of the members of the Adult
Authority, parole procedures, the factors considered in determining a prisr"ner'8 fitness for parole, and the possibility
of parole for fim degree murderers. The prosecuting attorney attempted to wcit from the witness testimony showing
that the policies qf the Adult Authority were inconsistent
and that tMre was considerable recidivism among paroled
first degree murde-rers.
[2] In his arg-'IlIDent the prosecutor prefaced his remarks
about the possibility of parole by stating, "The alternative
punishment to the death penalty is life imprisonment, and 88
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you know by now, after listening to [the former member of;
the Adult Authority] ••• , life imprisonment in California'~
certainly doesn't mean life imprisonment. It certainly';
doesn't mean life imprisonment." He went on to attack the'
Adult Authority generally: " •.. as you saw, [the statistics
purporting to show the median time served by life termers)
... varied quite a bit, and that variation goes to show, if
anything, that there is complete inconsistency in the Adult'
Authority. " He attacked the ex-member witness in particular:
., He didn't have any training at all..•. ' I Because of the
members' poor qualifications, he argued, the Authority can
be fooled and "bingo, [the prisoner] ... is back out on the
streets again, again threatening the lawful eommunity.•••
So, this is what life imprisonment means."
The trial court then instructed the jurors that they might
consider the possibility of parole nfter at least seven years'
imprisonment in deciding which penalty to choose.
TllUs the errors condemned in Morse were committed in
petitioner's trial, and were clearly prejudicial. (People v.
Hilles, ante, pp. 164, 169-170 [37 Ca1.Rptr. 662, 390 P.2d
398].)
The writ is granted as to the penalty trial of petitioner. The
remittitur issued in Crim. No. 6999, People v. Imbler, is recalled, and the judgment imposing the death penalty is
reycrsed insofar as it relates to the penalty. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed. Petitioner is remanded to the
custody of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County for a
new penalty trial.
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., and Peek, J., eoncurred.
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-I would deny the writ of
habeas corpus and permit tIle trial court's judgment to stand
as rendered and heretofore affirmed. (See People v. Imbler
(1962) 57 Cal.2d 711 [21 Ca1.Rptr. 568, 371 P.2d 304] ; In
re Imbler (1963) 60 Ca1.2d 554, 558, 571 (35 Cal.Rptr. 293,
887 P.2d 6] ["Proceeding in habeas corpus to secure release
from cU8tody, or for a writ of error coram 'Vobis, or other
appropriate relief"]; In re Jackson (1964) ante, pp. 500,
508 [39 Cal.Rptr. 220, 393 P.2d 420] (dissenting opinion of
McComb, J.).)
McComb, J., concurred.
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